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Abstract
This paper presents a model of capital accumulation and income distribution
that comes from the dynamic interaction between capitalists and workers in an
economy. The model is later applied to fit data from the Argentine and the US
economies, and to test if they are closer to the implications of a competitive or a
bargaining solution. The first one is associated to a Walrasian equilibrium of the
theoretical model, while the second is computed as a Nash cooperative solution.
The empirical results obtained seem to confirm our original intuitions that the
United States exhibits a greater degree of competitive behavior and bargaining
forces have been more important in Argentina, but no single behavioral hypothesis
is able to explain income distribution in any of the two countries.
Resumen
Este trabajo presenta un modelo de acumulación de capital y distribución del
ingreso que surge de la interacción dinámica entre los capitalistas y los trabajadores
de una economía. El modelo se aplica a sendas bases de datos correspondientes a
las economías argentina y estadounidense, a fin de verificar si las mismas siguen un
comportamiento ligado a la competencia o a la negociación colectiva. A la primera
de tales hipótesis se la asocia con un equilibrio walrasiano del modelo teórico, en
tanto que a la segunda se la computa como una solución cooperativa de Nash. Los
resultados empíricos parecen confirmar la intuición original de que los Estados
Unidos exhiben un nivel mayor de comportamiento competitivo y de que la
negociación colectiva ha jugado un papel más importante en la Argentina, pero
ninguna de las dos hipótesis puras es capaz de explicar totalmente la distribución del
ingreso en ninguno de los dos países.
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In previous work of ours (Coloma, 1996) we saw that alternative behavioral
assumptions about capitalists and workers in an economy, together with changes in
the rules which govern their interaction, were able to generate different equilibrium
patterns of capital accumulation and income distribution. These alternative patterns
can be used to calibrate macroeconomic models and to test hypotheses about the
characteristics of the economy and the behavior of its agents of production.
In this paper we show an example of application of the ideas described
before to the cases of Argentina and the United States. To do that, we use
aggregate data from the National Income and Product Accounts and from other
related sources. With those data we estimate the basic parameters of the utility and
production functions of representative capitalists and workers in the two
economies. That information is later used to test if the income distributions in the
Argentine and the US cases are closer to the implications of a competitive or a
bargaining solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we explain some basic
macroeconomic characteristics of Argentina and the United States during the
periods of time considered, and in section 2 we summarize the basic theoretical
model that underlies our work. In section 3 we describe the functional forms and
the estimation strategy that we use to proceed with our empirical exercise, while in
section 4 we analyze the basic results that we obtain. Finally, section 5 presents the
conclusions drawn from the analysis.
1. Characteristics of the economies
Although both nations share some common geographical and historical
elements, Argentina and the United States are essentially two very different
countries. The former is a mid-size, mid-income Latin American country, while the
latter has a much larger area, population and income per capita, and its gross
domestic product is by far the largest in the world. Therefore, the choice of these3
two examples does not pretend to compare the basic macroeconomic dimensions of
two clearly distinct examples, but relies on the fact that these are the two economies
whose data are more readily available to us.
There is, however, an important intuition that make the Argentine and the
US economies interesting examples of cases which are ex-ante close to two types of
intertemporal equilibria. The United States is one of the countries where markets
have always been more developed and competition has been an explicit goal of its
policy-makers. On the contrary, Argentina has a long history of protectionism and
intervention and, especially after 1945, a tradition of large-scale bargaining between
its economic actors. This may imply that the US is likely to be a relatively pure
example of an economy whose dynamic equilibrium follows a Walrasian path, while
Argentina’s long-term position may probably be closer to a bargaining outcome
such as the Nash solution.
In order to test if those ideas are correct, we first need to collect some data
for the two economies. In both cases, we construct databases of 38 annual
observations, which contain information about 12 variables. Those variables are
output (q), labor (h), capital stock (k), workers’ consumption (cL), capitalists’ net
income (ynK), investment (inv), capitalists’ consumption (cK), depreciation of the
capital stock (dep), per-capita labor productivity (g), wage rate (w), depreciation
rate (d) and population (pop).
For the case of the United States, our data cover the years between 1954
and 1991, while for Argentina the observations correspond to the period 1943-
1980. For the US economy our basic source is the Citibase data bank, produced by
Citicorp (1994), but the data on capital stocks is taken from Musgrave (1992).  For
Argentina, all the data come from a work by the Instituto de Estudios Económicos
sobre la Realidad Argentina y Latinoamericana (IEERAL, 1986), which compiles
statistics on the economic evolution of Argentina. Where possible, the series whose
expression is in monetary units are constructed using nominal data deflated by an
index of implicit GDP prices.4
Due to discrepancies in our statistical sources, we sometimes had to use
different methodologies to measure the same phenomena in each country. Probably
the most noticeable difference appears in the measurement of labor, which for the
United States consists of an estimation of the total number of hours worked, and for
Argentina is a series of the total number of employed people. Population is also
measured differently, since for the US economy we use a series of potentially active
population defined as the total number of inhabitants older than 17 years of age,
while for Argentina we use an estimation of the total population in the country. For
the United States, workers’ consumption is defined as equal to the total
remuneration of labor in the economy, and the wage rate (per hour) is obtained by
dividing that remuneration by the number of hours worked. Conversely, for
Argentina we have a series of annual wages per capita, and we obtain the total
workers’ consumption by multiplying that series by the one referred to total
employment.
For both countries, however, the net income of the capitalists is defined as
the sum of the rewards received in the economy in concept of interests, rents and
profits, and the depreciation rate is the ratio between the total depreciation and the
capital stock at the beginning of each year. The capitalists’ consumption is obtained
by adding up their net income and the total depreciation and subtracting the
investment, which is defined as equal to the internal gross investment. Total output
is obtained as the sum of workers’ consumption, capitalists’ consumption and
investment, and it does not include the portions of income whose distribution is
ambiguous. Finally, the level of per-capita labor productivity is measured as an
index of the evolution of output per capita.
Although the variables chosen to calibrate our economies are the same in
both cases, the different methodologies used and the fact that the data comes from
different sources and is expressed in different units (dollars of 1987 for the United
States, and pesos of 1960 for Argentina) make some absolute comparisons
meaningless or even impossible. However, we are still able to calculate some5
comparable rates and indices for the two economies, like the ones which appear on
table 1. Due to the differences in the periods covered in our series of observations,
the numbers for Argentina have been divided into two sub-periods: the first eleven
years (1943-1953), and the last twenty-six (1954-1980). The same criterion is
followed for the case of the United States, where the two sub-periods are 1954-
1980 and 1981-1991.
The figures on table 1 show important structural differences between both
countries in all the indicators that have to do with the distribution of income and the
use of capital. If we look at the period that goes from 1954 to 1980, for example,
the participation of wages in total income (W/Y) averages almost 65% in the United
States and is smaller than 49% in Argentina. Conversely, the rate of return of
capital (R/K), measured as the ratio between “ynK” and “k”, is almost five points
higher in Argentina than in the US. The ratio of capital to income (K/Y) is also
considerably higher in Argentina.
1. Basic Macroeconomic Indicators
Concept W / Y K / Y I / Y R / K Growth
Argentina
         1943-1953 0,5569 2,2037 0,1407 0,1632 0,0152
         1954-1980 0,4860 2,1787 0,2063 0,1842 0,0177
         1943-1980 0,4983 2,1831 0,1950 0,1805 0,0169
United States
         1954-1980 0,6462 1,7499 0,1804 0,1364 0,0163
         1981-1991 0,6418 1,9759 0,1753 0,1152 0,0191
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2. Rate of Per Capita Growth
(% with respect to previous year)7
Contrary to what one would expect, the rate of per-capita income growth
that both economies exhibit during the period 1954-1980 is almost the same
(between 1.6% and 1.8% per year), and the ratio of investment to income (I/Y) is
even higher in Argentina than in the United States
1.  Moreover, the movements of
the growth rate in both countries are considerably erratic along time, although in
general the US seems to exhibit a slightly smaller dispersion, as figure 2 shows.
What really strikes as extremely different between the two countries, however, is
the evolution of their wage shares in total income. In this item, the figure for the US
follows a relatively stable pattern which is never below 60% and never above 70%,
while Argentina begins with a share above 55% in the late fifties which falls below
40% in the late seventies (see figure 1).
2. Theoretical model 
2
In order to model capital accumulation and income distribution along time,
let us define an economy with one worker and one capitalist. Both agents are
infinitely lived and have strictly concave, twice differentiable utility functions that
depend positively on their own consumptions. The worker’s utility also depends
negatively on the amount of labor that he supplies. The two utility functions are
additively separable along time, and exhibit constant discount factors. No
uncertainty is considered. The capitalist is the one who owns the capital in the
economy, and is also the owner of the means of production (firms). He is the only
one who saves (through capital accumulation) but does not work. The worker,
conversely, works but does not save.
The worker’s economic problem can be represented as a maximization of an
                                                       
1 These numbers are deceiving in one important aspect, related to the moment in which we end the
series for Argentina. If we continued those series for two more years (until 1982), the Argentine
output per capita would reflect an additional decrease of 14.34%. However, we preferred to stop
our statistics in 1980 due to problems in the quality of the information, which would considerably
distort the parameters to be estimated.
2 This section draws heavily on Coloma (1996).8
average intertemporal utility function (VL) subject to a series of budget constraints:
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where “cLt” is the worker’s consumption in period “t”, “ht” is his supply of labor
(expressed as a fraction of his total endowment of available time), “b” is the
common discount factor and “wt” is the wage rate.
The capitalist’s problem, in turn, can be described as a maximization of
another average intertemporal utility function (VK) subject to a law of motion for
capital accumulation:







￿ b ￿ b - =         s.t.  kt+1 £ kt.(1-d) + ƒ(kt, ht) - wt.ht - cKt      ;
where “cKt” is the capitalist’s consumption in period “t”, “kt” is his stock of capital
at the beginning of that period, “d” is the rate of depreciation of capital, and “ƒ” is
the (strictly concave, twice differentiable) aggregate production function of the
economy.
The agents of this economy trade two goods in each period: output (which
is used for consumption and capital accumulation by the capitalist, and only for
consumption by the worker) and labor. The directions of those trades are also
unique: the capitalist sells part of his output to the worker, and the worker sells his
labor (which he extracts from a fixed supply of time) to the capitalist. Having
normalized the price of output as equal to one in every period, the only relative
price to be determined is the real wage (wt).
Two kinds of equilibria are going to be defined for this economy: a
Walrasian equilibrium and a bargaining equilibrium based on the so called “Nash
cooperative solution”. To define a Walrasian equilibrium, we must find sequences
of equilibrium levels of employment (amounts of labor traded in each period),
capital stocks  and equilibrium wages, such that both agents maximize their average9
intertemporal utility functions and both markets (output and labor) clear. The other
variables (total output, worker’s consumption, capitalist’s consumption) can be
determined by directly substituting the three mentioned sequences in the production
function and in the corresponding budget constraints, which always hold as
equalities.
The conditions for such an equilibrium can be written as a system of four
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kt+1  =  kt.(1-d) + ƒ(kt, ht) - wt.ht - cKt  ;
where “lt” is the worker’s leisure (equal to “1 - ht”) and “rt” is the implicit rental rate
that the capitalist receives. These equations generate sequences of wages and
implicit rental rates, which contain values that follow the same recursive conditions
in each period. These imply the equality between the marginal product of labor and
the worker’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, and the
equality between the marginal product of capital and an expression which depends
on the capitalist’s marginal utility of consumption in consecutive periods, the
discount factor and the rate of depreciation.
The concept of Walrasian equilibrium that we have developed is a suitable
one to represent the behavior of a competitive economy. As we see, income
distribution is strictly determined by a marginal productivity theory, and is the same
one that we could have obtained using a model with a single representative agent.
An alternative concept to contrast with the Walrasian equilibrium is the Nash
cooperative solution, which considers that the equilibrium levels of capital10
accumulation and income distribution come from bargaining and not from
competition. Applied to an economy, this concept can be used as a stylization of a
situation in which resource allocation is the result of a process of negotiation
between the main economic forces (for example, between the capitalists’
associations and the workers’ unions).
The definition of the Nash cooperative solution is independent from any
particular assumption about the bargaining process between the agents of
production. In general, this solution is axiomatically defined by four conditions:
individual rationality, symmetry of treatment, invariance to positive affine utility
transformations, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Applied to any
bargaining problem in which the players have Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions the fulfillment of these four conditions is satisfied by a unique outcome,
which also turns out to be efficient. This outcome is the one that maximizes a
certain function, known as the Nash product (N), which in our case can be written
as follows:
N  =  [VL – VL(M)]￿[VK – VK(M)]  ;
where “VL(M)” and “VK(M)” are the minmax values for the worker’s and the
capitalist’s average intertemporal utility functions.  These values are defined in the
following way:
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and correspond to a situation where the worker does not work and does not
consume, while the capitalist does not produce. In this situation, provided that the
discount factor “b” tends to one, the worker gets all his utility from a stationary
(maximum) level of leisure and the capitalist’s utility level converges asymptotically11
to a point where he runs out of capital and gets zero consumption.
The equilibrium conditions under a Nash cooperative solution for our
economy can be expressed through the following system of four equations:
( )























) 1 t ( K K
t
;
kt+1  =  kt.(1-d) + ƒ(kt, ht) - wt.ht - cKt  ;
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
V V M
V V M
u u w dh dw u h















- ￿ ￿ - ￿
￿ - ￿ + - ￿ -
( )
( ) f f d
;
where “h ”, “k” and “w ” are the steady-state levels of employment, capital and
wages. This solution typically implies departures from the Walrasian equilibrium
conditions that connect wage and depreciation rates with marginal products and
utilities.
The outcome actually chosen by the Nash cooperative solution basically
depends on two elements, which typify the problem that we are analyzing. One is
the level of the minmax reservation utilities of the capitalist and the worker. The
other is the shape of their utility functions and, in particular, their concavity. This
last feature is related with the concept of the players’ risk-aversion and, as a result
of it, the less risk-averse player (i.e, the one whose utility function is “less
concave”) ends up receiving a relatively higher utility than the more risk-averse one.
The adjoint diagram is a representation of the concepts that we have seen in
the space of average intertemporal utilities. The utility possibility frontier is drawn
as a downward-sloping curve that relates the different capitalist’s utility levels (VK)
with the maximum possible worker’s utility (VL). The minmax point (M) is also
located in the diagram, so we are able to define the area of individually rational
solutions by using the horizontal and vertical lines that have M as the origin. One of12
its efficient points (N) corresponds to the Nash cooperative solution, where the
frontier is tangent to the highest utility isoproduct curve (VL*VK). Another one
(W) corresponds to the Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
3. Estimation specifications
Following the general approach described in the previous section, our
empirical exercise consists of a series of regressions that try to capture the
relationships among variables decided by capitalists and workers. These are
basically given by an aggregate production function that relates output to capital
and labor, a series of equilibrium conditions that come from the existence of utility
functions for our two representative agents of production, and a wage equation
whose shape depends on the kind of equilibrium that we assume for the economy.
As both the Walrasian equilibrium allocation and the Nash bargaining
solution share the characteristic that they are located in the utility possibility frontier
of the economy, we can assume that in both cases output is determined by the same
aggregate production function and that the marginal products of labor and capital
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if the economy is somewhere between the Walrasian equilibrium and the Nash
bargaining solution, we can first estimate its production function and efficiency
conditions, and then regress a wage equation that tells us how close it is to one or
the other alternative positions.
Given that estimation strategy, we first postulate specific functional forms
for the economy’s aggregate production function and for the representative
capitalist’s and worker’s utility functions. As a matter of convenience, we choose a
Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale, a Cobb-Douglas
utility function for the capitalist, and a separable utility function for the worker
which is also linear in leisure
3. Those three functions are therefore the following:




uK(cKt)  =  cKt
s ;
uL(cLt, 1-ht)  =  cLt
a  -  B.ht ;
where “gt” is the level of per-capita labor productivity (in a context of labor-
augmenting technical progress)
4 and “A”, “B”, “q”, “s” and “a” are parameters to
be estimated, together with the discount factor “b”.
 To find the values of the parameters for our production and utility
functions, we observe the following procedure. First of all, we estimate the
aggregate production function by running a regression under this logarithmic
specification:
ln(qt)  =  ln(A)  + q.ln(kt) + (1-q).ln(ht.gt) .
                                                       
3 This last assumption is relatively common in the literature on business cycles, since it provides a
highly effective way of matching the observed variance of hours worked in US data. See Hansen
(1985).
4 The inclusion of an assumption of labor-augmenting technical progress has a consequence on the
dynamics of the system, since it implies that the equilibrium converges to a “balanced growth
path” instead of a steady state. This is consistent with the existence of growth in per-capita
income.14
Once we know the value for “q”, we use it to build series of marginal products of
labor and capital, respectively defined as “mpl = (1-q).q/h” and “mpk = q.q/k”. This
last concept is then modified by the effect of depreciation, and re-expressed as an
“adjusted marginal product of capital” (ampk = q.q/k + 1 - d).
After constructing our series of marginal products, we run a regression of a
system of equations formed by the efficiency conditions, which postulate that “mpl”
must be equal to the ratio of marginal utilities of workers’ leisure and consumption,
and that “ampk” must be equal to the ratio of discounted marginal utilities of
capitalists’ consumption in two consecutive years. This allows to estimate the
relevant parameters of our model without defining the type of economy that we are
dealing with, provided that we are at some point in the utility possibility frontier.
Set in logarithmic form, the system of efficiency conditions gives the following
regression equations:
ln(mplt)  =  ln(B/a)  +  (1-a).ln(cLt) ;
ln(ampkt)  =  ln(1/b)  +  (1-s).ln(cKt)  +  (s-1).ln(cKt-1) .
After estimating the basic parameters of the model, our last task is to
compare the relative effect of competitive and bargaining elements on the
determination of the wage rate. The first step of this process consists of calculating
two series of limit wages (wmaxt, wmint), which represent the wage rates that
prevail in the points of the utility possibility frontier where the capitalists and the
workers respectively get their minmax payoffs. Next, we use this information to
estimate a series of Nash solution wages (wnst), defined as the ones for which the
Nash product of the capitalist’s and the worker’s utilities is maximized. Once we
have that, we run a regression for the actual wage rate on “mpl” and “wns”, whose
aim is to measure the relative degree of competitiveness of the economy (l). As an
additional information, we also estimate a bargaining power coefficient (m), which15
comes from regressing “w” on “wmin” and “wmax”. The regression equations are
in this case linear, and they are written as:
wt  =  l.mplt  +  (1-l).wnst ;
wt  =  m.wmint  +  (1-m).wmaxt .
An interesting by-product of this specification is the actual estimation of a
utility possibility frontier, together with series of implicit variables related to the
Nash bargaining solution. One important assumption that we make to calculate
those series is that the economy is always on a balanced growth path
5. Given this,
we can write the following relationships between the efficient levels of employment
(hEF), capital (kEF) and wages (wEF):
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Given this, the annual payoffs that capitalists and workers get when they are at a
point of the utility possibility frontier (VK(EF), VL(EF)) can be written as the





























































































                                                       
5  This assumption is consistent with a situation where capitalists are risk-neutral.16
Let us now define the feasible bargaining region of the utility possibility
frontier as the set of combinations of capitalist’s and worker’s utilities where both
agents get more than their minmax values. Due to the form of the utility functions
that we are using, these minmax values are equal to zero in a stationary situation, so
the minimum and maximum efficient wages (wmin, wmax) that both capitalists and
workers accept are given by:
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To find a bargaining wage rate, finally, we maximize the product of













As we see, this wage rate under the Nash bargaining solution depends positively on
the two limit wages that we have already defined, and negatively on the value of
“s”. Indirectly, it also increases when “mpl” or “a” grow. All this is consistent with
the assumption that bargaining is more favorable to the relatively less risk-averse
agent.
4. Empirical results
As we mentioned in the last section, the empirical implementation of our
model for the cases of Argentina and the United States must be performed in three
steps, associated to the estimation of the production function, the efficiency
conditions and the wage equations. Due to the type of functions that we postulate,
all regressions are run using linear least square methodologies.17
For the aggregate production function regression, we use ordinary least
squares. To deal with possible heteroscedasticity effects, we correct the variance-
covariance matrix using White’s method, and we also control for first-order
autocorrelation by applying the Prais-Winsten algorithm. With the results of this
regression we calculate the series of “mpl” and “ampk”, and then regress the system
of efficiency conditions by using three-stage least squares. This consists of replacing
the workers’ and the capitalists’ consumptions by instrumental variables, and then
use those instruments as independent variables in a seemingly unrelated regression
of the efficiency conditions. To solve the endogeneity problems that “cL” and “cK”
may exhibit, we substitute them by fitted values of previous regressions run on
lagged versions of those variables and on all the exogenous variables in our data
sets (k, dep, pop, g, year). This takes into consideration possible correlations
between the residuals of the two efficiency condition equations and, since we also
use the Prais-Winsten algorithm, it allows for first-order autocorrelation among
each equation’s residuals.
Using the parameters estimated in the two previous rounds of regressions,
we calculate the series of maximum, minimum and Nash solution wages that we
need for our wage equation regressions. Once we have them, we perform those
regressions by running ordinary least squares with the same heteroscedasticity
correction made for the aggregate production function. These regressions are
complemented by a series of tests that attempt to contrast competitive and
bargaining hypotheses, looking for the effect of alternative restrictions on the
goodness of fit of the models. These tests are F-tests on the joint significance of the
restrictions and Cox tests on the relative power of one hypothesis against the other.
The results of our procedures are summarized in table 2, both for Argentina
and the United States. In it we observe that the distribution parameters “q” are
relatively small for both countries (0.3002 for the US and 0.1838 for Argentina),
especially if we compare them with the average shares of capitalists in total income
(which are 0.3555 and 0.5017, respectively). This comparison tells us that in the18
two cases the capitalists get a larger fraction of income than the one expected under
a purely competitive distribution rule, but we also see that the gap between “R/Y”
and “q” is considerably wider in Argentina than in the United States.
The estimates for “s” are almost identical in the two economies (0.9967 and
0.9998) and imply that capitalists exhibit a risk-neutral behavior, since none of those
coefficients is significantly different from one. Conversely, workers seem to be
considerably risk-averse, since the estimated values for “a” (0.4478 for Argentina,
and 0.4966 for the US) are both significantly different from one. The implicit rate of
time preference, however, seems to be larger in the United States than in Argentina,
whose discount factor “b” is almost 5% higher than the US one. All the parameters
estimated in the first two steps of our procedure are statistically different from zero
at all possible levels of significance for the two countries, and the coefficients of
determination of the regressions (R
2) are always greater than 0.98.
2. Empirical Results
Country        Argentina     United States
Parameter Coeff %Signif Coeff %Signif
Theta 0,1838 0,01 0,3002 0,00
Alfa 0,4478 0,00 0,4966 0,00
Beta 0,9503 0,15 0,9005 0,00
Sigma 0,9967 0,00 0,9998 0,00
Lambda -0,0574 21,70 0,7175 0,00
Mu 0,7393 0,00 0,4629 0,00
R² Prod funct 0,9944 0,9838
R² Effic condit 0,9835 0,9867
R² Wage equat 1 0,3694 0,9820
R² Wage equat 2 0,3755 0,9062
F-tests
Walrasian Equil 283,57 0,00 685,96 0,00
Nash Solution 1,2746 29,19 4413,5 0,00
Cox tests
WE vs NS -3,5351 99,98 0,6120 27,03
NS vs WE 0,8160 20,73 -1,6211 94,7519
The two equations run to determine the relative influence of the marginal
product of labor, the Nash solution wage and the limit wages on the actual income
distribution give very different results for the Argentine and the US cases. In the
latter, the parameter which measures competitiveness (l) is able to explain more
than 70% of the observed wages, while in the former its impact is not significantly
different from zero. If we look at the results of the regressions of actual wages on
maximum and minimum rates, moreover, our measure of the capitalists’ relative
market power (m) is noticeably greater in Argentina (0.7393) than in the United
States (0.4629). This last country also gives a much better fit in the regressions,
since its R
2 coefficients are both larger than 0.9 while the Argentine ones are both
smaller than 0.4.
Two additional regressions are performed in order to test for the relative
importance of competitive and bargaining elements on the determination of wages
in the two economies. They also regress “w” on “mpl” and “wns”, but alternatively
restrict the values of the coefficients to be zero or one. This implies that only
Walrasian or Nash solution forces enter in the models, so that we can contrast them
through a series of F-tests that check the validity of those assumptions. The results
of those tests seem to indicate that for the case of the United States none of the two
hypotheses alone explains the observed series of wages, since both F-statistics are
extremely high and consequently their degree of significance is very low.
Conversely, in the Argentine case the Nash bargaining hypothesis reduces the
goodness of fit only slightly, and therefore the corresponding F-statistic is much
smaller and its significance is much higher.
An alternative testing methodology is given by the use of Cox tests, which
compare the ability of each alternative specification (Walrasian equilibrium or Nash
solution) to explain the residuals of the wage equation run under the other
hypothesis. This is done by regressing those residuals on the regressors and the
restrictions of the alternative model, and by constructing a normally distributed
statistic using the estimated variance of this new dependent variable together with20
the ones obtained in the two original regressions
6. The results obtained show that
the hypothesis of a Walrasian equilibrium is clearly rejected for Argentina while the
one of a Nash bargaining solution is clearly rejected for the United States, since
their corresponding Cox statistics are very small (-3.5351 and -1.6211). The inverse
hypotheses, however, are also rejected for both countries, although their respective
statistics are higher and their margins of rejection are considerably smaller. No
single explanation, therefore, seems to be possible for any of the two economies,
although the income distribution in the US is clearly more competitive while the one
that we observe in Argentina seems to be more strongly guided by bargaining
forces.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the evolution of the average wage in Argentina and the
United States during the periods covered by our data sets. The diagrams also depict
our estimations for the marginal product of labor (mpl), the Nash solution wage
(wns), and the upper and lower wage limits under an efficient and individually
rational solution (wmin, wmax). What we first observe is that the path of US wages
is clearly smoother, while the Argentine one exhibits very sharp movements whose
amplitude increases during the 1970’s. For both economies the marginal product of
labor is always higher than the Nash solution wage, and the two of them always lie
between the upper and lower wage limits.
However, figures 3 and 4 also show that “mpl” is much closer to “wmax” in
Argentina than in the United States, probably because of the smaller value that we
have found for the parameter “q” in the first of those countries. Finally, we observe
that while the actual US wage is always between the “mpl” and “wns” lines (and
closer to the first of them), the Argentine one moves around the Nash solution wage
and even drops below the “wmin” line in 1976 and 1977. These differences in the
behavior of the series are related to the way in which our wage regressions fit the
actual data, which is clearly better for the United States than for Argentina.
                                                       
6 The test performed here is in fact a variation of the original one proposed by Cox (1961) and
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5. Conclusions
The basic conclusion of this empirical application of our model of capital
accumulation and income distribution is probably that the model itself provides a
suitable way of contrasting dynamic equilibrium hypotheses when applied to actual
data. Our particular examples compare two alternative explanations (perfect
competition versus “perfect bargaining”) and estimate the degree of mixture of the
two that we find in the Argentine and the US economies during a relatively long
period of time.
The main empirical results that we obtain seem to confirm our original
intuitions that the United States exhibits a greater degree of competitive behavior,
while bargaining forces seem to be more important in Argentina. Due to the
difference in risk aversion between capitalists and workers, this outcome also
implies that the relative market power of capitalists is considerably higher in
Argentina.
However, no single behavioral hypothesis is able to explain income
distribution in any of the two countries, although in the United States the Walrasian
equilibrium model captures almost 72% of the observed wage rates while in
Argentina the coefficient of competitive behavior is not significantly different from
zero. The very good fit of the wage equation regressions for the American case,
moreover, seem to indicate that perceiving the US economy as a relatively stable
mix of competitive and bargaining elements may be a reasonable way to study its
process of accumulation and distribution. Conversely, the results for the Argentine
case suggest that there are other factors that influence the apportioning of income,
and that the relative weight of those factors has probably changed during the period
under consideration.23
Appendix: Programming procedures
The following program, written in Limdep 6.0, describes the procedures
used in our empirical estimation for both the Argentine and the US databases. For
additional details on these procedures, see Greene (1992).
? Read in the data
READ ; Nobs=38 ; Nvar=7 ; File=data1.txt ;
Names=year,q,h,k,cl,ynk,inv $
READ ; Nobs=38 ; Nvar=7 ; File=data2.txt ;
Names=ck,dep,gr,w,d,r,pop $
OPEN ; OUTPUT=chapter4.out $
DSTAT ; Rhs=q,h,k,cl,inv,ck,gr,w,d,pop $
? Production function
CREATE ; lq=log(q) ; lk=log(k) ; hgr=h*gr ; lhgr=log(hgr) $
SAMPLE ; All $
REGRESS ; Lhs=lq ; Rhs=one,lk,lhgr ; Hetero ; AR1 ; Cls: B(2) + B(3) = 1 $
MATRIX ; BP=B ; VP=VARB $
CALC ; A1=exp(BP(1)) $
CREATE ; mpl=BP(3)*q/h ; mpk=BP(2)*q/k ; ampk=mpk+1-d ;
wmax=A1*(BP(2)*mpl/mpk/BP(3))^BP(2)*gr^BP(3)-d*mpl*BP(2)/mpk/BP(3) ;
lmpl=log(mpl) ; lampk=log(ampk) $
? Efficiency conditions
CREATE ; lcl=log(cl) ; lck=log(ck) ;
ldep=log(dep) ; lpop=log(pop) ; lgr=log(gr) $
SAMPLE ; 2-38 $
REGRESS ; Lhs=lcl ; Rhs=one,year,lk,lgr,lpop,ldep,lcl[-1],lck[-1] ; Keep=lclf $
REGRESS ; Lhs=lck ; Rhs=one,year,lk,lgr,lpop,ldep,lcl[-1],lck[-1] ; Keep=lckf $
SAMPLE ; 2-38 $
SURE ; Lhs=lmpl,lampk ; Eq1=one,lclf ; Eq2=one,lckf,lckf[-1] ;
Model=1 ; Maxit=1 ; Cls: B(4)+B(5)=0 $
MATRIX ; BE=B ; VE=VARB $
CALC ; alfa=1-BE(2); sig=1-BE(4); beta=1/exp(BE(3)); A2=exp(BE(1))*alfa $
? Wage equations
SAMPLE ; All $
CREATE ; wmin=alfa*mpl ; wns=(1+sig)/(sig/wmin+1/wmax) $
REGRESS ; Lhs=w ; Rhs=mpl,wns ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)+B(2)=1 $
MATRIX ; BW1=B ; VW1=VARB $
REGRESS ; Lhs=w ; Rhs=wmin,wmax ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)+B(2)=1 $
MATRIX ; BW2=B ; VW2=VARB $24
CALC ; lambda= BW1(1) ; mu=BW2(1) $
? Alternative hypotheses
SAMPLE ; All $
? Walrasian equilibrium (WE)
REGRESS ; Lhs=w ; Rhs=mpl,wns ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)=1, B(2)=0 ; Res=rw $
CALC ; sw=ssqrd $
? Nash bargaining solution (NS)
REGRESS ; Lhs=w ; Rhs=mpl,wns ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)=0, B(2)=1 ; Res=rn $
CALC ; sn=ssqrd $
? Cox tests
SAMPLE ; All $
? WE vs NS
REGRESS ; Lhs=rn ; Rhs=mpl ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)=1 $
CALC ; swn=ssqrd ; twn=38*log(sn/sw)/2/sqr(38*swn/sw) ; pwn=1-phi(twn) $
? NS vs WE
REGRESS ; Lhs=rw ; Rhs=wns ; Hetero ; Cls: B(1)=1 $
CALC ; snw=ssqrd ; tnw=38*log(sw/sn)/2/sqr(38*snw/sn) ; pnw=1-phi(tnw) $25
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